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Domestic Violence and the Home-Centric Second Amendment 
JOSEPH BLOCHER* 
The most prominent line-drawing debate in Second Amendment law and scholarship 
is whether and to what degree the right to keep and bear arms extends outside the home. 
Inside the home, the right is thought to be strongest, as private interests are at their apex 
and governmental interests are correspondingly weaker. But an uncritical acceptance of 
this home-centric Second Amendment is not well-equipped to account for the intersection 
between guns and domestic violence (DV). For women in particular, domestic violence in 
the home is a more significant threat than assault by a stranger, and studies have shown 
that the availability of a firearm in the home can exacerbate the already-significant risk that 
such violence ends in murder. The reality of armed DV poses a challenge for the home-
bound or home-centric right to keep and bear arms, and for Second Amendment law and 
scholarship more generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of this short Article is to bring together two parallel legal debates 
whose intersection has not been thoroughly explored: the desirability and 
constitutionality of laws designed to prevent domestic violence involving guns1 (a 
matter about which there is, in many ways, a surprising degree of agreement2) and 
the degree to which the right to keep and bear arms is limited to the home (a matter 
about which there is substantial disagreement3). That intersection—illuminated by 
feminist legal scholarship on the concept of the “home”—sheds new light on 
standard positions in the gun debate. 
The degree to which the right to keep and bear arms is home-bound4—or at 
least home-centric, in the sense that it is strongest within the home—is perhaps the 
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 1.  I use the phrase “domestic violence” in part because its terminology evokes the home, which 
is my subject, and I will focus in particular on violence perpetrated by men against women, which 
accounts for the overwhelming majority of cases. Of course, intimate partner violence arises in other 
contexts as well, regardless of gender, marital status, or other markers. 
 2.  See, e.g., Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Bans, 14 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 1, 27 (2005) (“The Domestic Violence Firearms Bans were passed despite a national trend of 
weakening gun control.”). 
 3.  See infra notes 30–31 and cases cited therein. 
 4.  For an early scholarly exchange, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns As Smut: Defending the Home-
Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1281 (2009) (arguing that we should treat the right 
to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment “the same way we treat the right to view adult 
obscenity under the First: a robust right to possess it in the home, subject to nearly plenary restriction 
by elected government officials everywhere else”); Eugene Volokh, The  First  and  Second  Amendments, 
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most important and most contested debate in Second Amendment law and 
scholarship. But that debate has not always grappled with the possibility that 
limiting the right to the home (a goal of many gun regulation supporters) would 
fail to address, and could even exacerbate, the threat of armed domestic violence. 
Although much of the gun debate focuses on public violence like mass 
shootings in schools and public places—and, to the degree, that it focuses on 
women at all, scenes like dark alleys and parking lots5—gun violence in the United 
States is often much more “private.”6 Roughly half of all firearms-related 
homicides occur within the home.7 Focusing on gun rights and regulation in public 
places might simply be a recognition of political necessity or constitutional 
limitation, but it also threatens to avoid addressing what is—especially for 
women—the primary site of gun violence. 
Men and women face strikingly different realities with regard to gun-related 
violence and homicides. For women in the United States, the primary threat is not 
necessarily lurking strangers, but intimate partners.8 A recent study from the 
Centers for Disease Control suggests that most women who are murdered in the 
United States are killed by an intimate partner, and that more than half of those 
murders involve a firearm.9 One recent study found that, in cases where the 
perpetrator could be identified, half of female homicide victims were killed by 
 
109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009), https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ 
Volokh.pdf (criticizing analogy to obscenity doctrine). 
 5.  See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Real Men Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered 
Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2014) (making this 
observation). NRA lobbyist Marion Hammer, perhaps the most prominent female gun lobbyist in the 
country, and architect of many of Florida’s gun-friendly laws, frequently tells a story about how she 
was menaced in a parking garage. See Mike Spies, The N.R.A. Lobbyist Behind Florida’s Pro-Gun Policies, 
NEW YORKER (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/03/05/the-nra-lobbyist-
behind-floridas-pro-gun-policies. And yet the Florida Castle Doctrine law, for which she advocated, 
specifically does not permit a woman to use deadly force in self-defense against a cohabitant unless 
there is an existing “injunction for protection from domestic violence . . . against that person.” Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 776.013 (2019); Franks, supra, at 1115. 
 6.  The two phenomena are not entirely distinct, of course, and in fact, there are links even 
between mass shootings—the archetypal act of public gun violence—and domestic violence. See, e.g., 
Nancy Leong, What Do Many Mass Shooters Have in Common? A History of Domestic Violence, WASH. POST 
(June 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/15/what-do-
many-mass-shooters-have-in-common-a-history-of-domestic-violence/. 
 7.  Mary D. Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 90 IND. 
L.J. 151, 156 (2015). 
 8.  Katie Zezima et al., Domestic Slayings: Brutal and Foreseeable, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/15/what-do-many-mass-shooter 
s-have-in-common-a-history-of-domestic-violence/ (finding that nearly half of women murdered in the 
past ten years were killed by a current or former intimate partner). 
 9.  Emiko Petrosky et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the Role of 
Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 2003–2014, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 741, 741 
(July 2017). See also Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting Access to 
Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner Homicide?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 313 
(2006) (concluding that roughly 60 percent of intimate-partner homicides are committed with a 
firearm). 
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intimate partners, as compared to just six percent of male homicide victims.10 
Roughly one million women in the United States have been shot, or shot at, by an 
intimate partner.11 Asking women to arm themselves in self-defense might only 
exacerbate the problem, as studies show that the presence of a gun makes it five 
times more likely that a woman will be killed by an abusive partner,12 and firearm 
ownership rates are positively related to rates of domestic homicide.13 
It is far beyond the scope of this short Article to analyze the effectiveness of 
laws addressing these problems.14 My more limited goal is to explore one specific 
but important way in which the evolving law and theory of the Second 
Amendment intersects with—and should take better note of—how gun rights and 
regulation impact women.15 In recent years, scholars have begun to explore that 
intersection in more depth;16 my focus here is on how using the “home” as an 
organizing principle for the Second Amendment could obscure or even worsen 
the problem of armed domestic violence, which for women is arguably the central 
problem of gun violence. 
Federal law, and the laws of many states, already restrict gun possession by 
those convicted of a DV misdemeanor or subject to a DV restraining order, and 
enforcement efforts seem to be ramping up in recent years.17 Those laws have 
almost universally been upheld against Second Amendment challenges, and their 
constitutional foundation seems secure. But an uncritical embrace of the home-
centric right to keep and bear arms could weaken that foundation, by providing 
abusers with a stronger argument for “private” gun possession in their homes. 
And regardless of what it means for the specific question of whether DV 
prohibitors are constitutional, a closer consideration of what the home-centric 
right to keep and bear arms means for women holds important lessons for the 
future of Second Amendment law and theory, including recent calls to adopt a test 
of “text, history, and tradition” for evaluating the constitutionality of gun 
regulations.18 
 
 10.  Carolyn B. Ramsey, Firearms in the Family, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1257, 1278 n.109 (2017) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 11.  Susan B. Sorenson & Rebecca A. Schut, Nonfatal Gun Use in Intimate Partner Violence: a 
Systematic Review of the Literature, 19 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 431, 431 (2018). 
 12.  Aaron J. Kivisto et al., Firearm Ownership and Domestic Versus Nondomestic Homicide in the U.S., 
57 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 311, 312 (2019). 
 13.  Jacqueline Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide Within Physically Abusive Intimate 
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1090 (2003). 
 14.  For a general overview, see Ramsey, supra note 10, at 1314–42. 
 15.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990) (noting that 
one feminist legal method is “identifying and challenging those elements of existing legal doctrine that 
leave out or disadvantage women and members of other excluded groups”). 
 16.  See, e.g., MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 51–104 (2018); Jennifer Carlson 
& Kristin A. Goss, Gendering the Second Amendment, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2017); C.D. 
Christensen, The “True Man” and His Gun: On the Masculine Mystique of Second Amendment Jurisprudence, 
23 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 477 (2017). 
 17.  See infra note 50. 
 18.  See, e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans 
and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or 
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I.   THE HOME-CENTRIC SECOND AMENDMENT 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in District of Columbia 
v. Heller,19 one of the most hotly litigated issues in Second Amendment law has 
been the degree to which the individual right to keep and bear arms includes a 
right to carry arms in public. This was not a question that the Court had to resolve 
in Heller, which focused largely on private possession of handguns within the 
home. Beginning with the first sentence of the opinion (which described the 
question presented in terms of home possession),20 Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion repeatedly invoked the word “home,” often in conjunction with that self-
defense interest.21 The Court defined the “core” of the Second Amendment as self-
defense,22 and noted that the self-defense interest is “most acute” in the home.23 
The Court also went on to emphasize that the individual right to keep and 
bear arms, like all constitutional rights, is subject to some forms of regulation.24 
The majority specifically noted: 
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.25 
Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Scalia also pointed to the longstanding 
legality of prohibitions on “dangerous and unusual” weapons26 and concealed 
carrying.27 Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court made the 
Second Amendment applicable against state and local governments, but again 
repeated its assurances that gun regulation and the right to keep and bear arms 
can coexist, and that “[s]tate and local experimentation with reasonable firearms 
regulations will continue . . . . ”28 
The Court did not, however, specifically address whether and how the right 
to keep and bear arms extends outside the home. And in the decade since Heller, 
 
intermediate scrutiny.”); Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 (5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., 
dissenting) (“Judge Kavanaugh is correct . . . .”), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 682 F.3d 361 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
 19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 20.  Id. at 573 (“We consider whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable 
handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution.”). 
 21.  Id. at 573, 575, 576, 577, 593, 615, & 616. 
 22.  Id. at 630; id. at 599 (“central component”). 
 23.  Id. at 628 (noting that the D.C. handgun law “extends . . . to the home, where the need for 
defense of self, family and property is most acute”). 
 24.  For an initial effort to describe some of the legal tools needed to evaluate the constitutionality 
of gun regulation after Heller, see JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018). 
 25.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 26.  Id. at 627. 
 27.  Id  at 626. 
 28.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting Brief for State of Texas et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23, McDonald, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 
4378909). 
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those questions have been central to some of the most important and contentious 
Second Amendment litigation throughout the country. One primary target of 
litigation has been “good cause” restrictions that require those seeking a permit to 
carry their guns in public (usually concealed) to show a sufficient reason for doing 
so.29 Although most of these laws have been upheld,30 some have not,31 and public 
carrying is generally regarded as the central battlefield in Second Amendment law. 
In defending these and other laws regulating gun use in public, gun violence 
prevention advocates have often argued for a home-bound—or at least home-
centric—Second Amendment. This argument draws strength from Heller itself (if 
the right is “most acute” in the home, it must be less acute elsewhere) and from 
the long history of regulating guns more stringently in public places.32 The 
argument also often invokes a kind of hydraulics involving the relative balance of 
private and public interests: The private interests of gun owners are at their apex 
in the home, to which the law often accords special treatment. In Woollard v. 
Gallagher, for example, the Fourth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a law 
regulating guns in public, but specifically noted that strict scrutiny might be 
appropriate for restrictions on the “core right of self-defense in the home.”33 
In other constitutional contexts, too, the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
emphasized the ways in which private conduct in the home is entitled to strong 
constitutional protection.34 As the majority put it in Lawrence v. Texas, “[i]n our 
tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.”35 That is true, notably, in the 
context of self-defense law, which traditionally gave greater latitude to acts of self-
defense—including especially the use of deadly force—within the home.36 As 
Blackstone emphasized, “the law of England has so particular and tender a regard 
 
 29.  See Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
218 (2014). 
 30.  See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 
919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 31.  See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) 
(striking down Washington, D.C.’s good-cause concealed carry licensing standard). See also Eric Ruben 
& Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After 
Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1484–85 (2018) (footnotes omitted) (noting that public carry challenges 
succeed at a higher rate than other categories of Second Amendment claims). 
 32.  See generally Patrick J. Charles, Faces of the Second Amendment Outside the Home: History Versus 
Ahistorical Standards of Review, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
 33.  Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876–78 (quotations and citations omitted). The outlier again is Wrenn, 
which held that the right to carry guns in public is “on par” with the right to do so at home. Wrenn, 864 
F.3d at 663. 
 34.  See, e.g. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (establishing constitutional protection for 
private possession of obscene materials); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would 
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of 
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationship.”). 
 35. Lawrence v. Texas,  539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 36.  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288 (“Every man’s house is looked upon by the law 
to be his castle.”); 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *162 (“A man’s house is 
his castle—for where shall a man be safe if it be not in his house?”). See generally CAROLINE E. LIGHT, 
STAND YOUR GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE (2018). 
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to the immunity of a man’s house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it 
to be violated with impunity . . . .”37 That tradition changed in American law by 
the end of the nineteenth century, with the adoption of the “true man” doctrine 
under which a person had no duty to retreat from any place where he had a right 
to be—even in places outside the home.38 And it continues to be revamped today 
with the spread of Stand Your Ground laws and other expansions of self-defense 
rights. But the traditional conception retains a powerful hold in law and the 
popular imagination.39 
Conversely (or symmetrically, depending on how one looks at it) the 
government’s interests in regulation are typically thought to be higher in the 
public square than in the home. In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, for example, 
the Second Circuit held that “[t]he state’s ability to regulate firearms and, for that 
matter, conduct, is qualitatively different in public” where “firearm rights have 
always been more limited” and there is a “tradition of states regulating firearm 
possession and use.”40 
The combination of these vectors points in the direction of a Second 
Amendment right that is robust within the home, but subject to substantial 
regulation outside of it. For many gun violence prevention advocates, this 
represents a kind of reasonable compromise. Gun owners have wide latitude to 
possess weapons at home. Once they bring guns into public spaces, however, the 
state’s interest in regulation increases, and there must be greater latitude for laws 
to prevent mayhem and murder. 
Although there are many dimensions to the gun debate and to Second 
Amendment litigation, it is fair to say that this is perhaps the most central and 
contested issue. But an uncritical focus on public regulation, and acceptance of gun 
possession at home, misses—and might exacerbate—the enormous problem of DV 
and the disproportionate harms it inflicts on women. 
II.  THE HOME AS A SITE OF GUN VIOLENCE 
The home-centric vision of the Second Amendment, though an attractive 
compromise position in many ways, is complicated by two other basic facts: Gun 
violence and the concept of the “home” are both gendered in important ways. 
As noted above,41 men and women face very different threats when it comes 
to gun violence. Only about 1 in 20 male victims of gun homicide is killed by an 
intimate partner; for women, the figure is about 1 in 2.42 Studies have shown that 
 
 37.  4 BLACKSTONE *223–24. 
 38.  Katelyn E. Keegan, Note, The True Man & the Battered Woman: Prospects for Gender-Neutral 
Narratives in Self-Defense Doctrines, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 263–64 (2013). 
 39.  JEANNIE SUK, AT HOME IN THE LAW: HOW DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING 
PRIVACY 76 (2009) (“Rhetoric among supporters of the Castle Doctrine laws has consistently focused 
on the home as the core imaginative location of self-defense.”). 
 40.  Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2012). See also United States v. 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“[A]s we move outside the home, 
firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh 
individual interests in self-defense.”). 
 41.  See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text. 
 42.  Ramsey, supra note 10, at 1278 n.109. Again, this figure only reflects those homicides in which 
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domestic violence is far more likely to result in homicide when a gun is present in 
the home. As Senator Frank Lautenberg put it, “[A]ll too often, the difference 
between a battered woman and a dead woman is the presence of a gun.”43 
(Although my focus here is on the intersection of domestic violence and firearms, 
it should be noted that the problem of domestic violence goes far beyond 
firearms—only 3.4 percent of nonfatal intimate partner injuries involved guns.44) 
Lautenberg’s advocacy helped earn passage of the legal prohibition that now 
bears his name. The Lautenberg Amendment, adopted in 1996, prohibits the 
receipt or possession of a firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce by 
anyone who has been convicted of or pled guilty to a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence.45 It thereby builds on a 1994 federal law that generally prohibits 
anyone subject to a domestic violence restraining order from possessing or 
receiving a firearm.46  Many states also have laws that restrict or prohibit firearm 
access by these groups.47 
The adoption of those laws did not immediately lead to rigorous 
enforcement. Especially in the first few years after the federal laws went into effect, 
prosecutions were quite rare,48 and there is still some reason to think that their 
application is uneven.49 But in recent years there has been increasing emphasis on 
enforcement at both the federal and state levels.50 This is a welcome development, 
though as with any law there are also potential costs of rigorous enforcement. It 
brings the state into the home in unprecedented ways,51 and “might chill the 
reporting of abuse; exacerbate recidivism; lead to unemployment, a known 
 
the perpetrator is identifiable. It seems plausible that stranger homicides are disproportionately likely 
to have unidentified perpetrators, meaning that the percentages of both men and women killed by 
intimate partners is much lower. The ratio between them would still be dramatically different, though. 
 43.  Alison J. Nathan, Note, At the Intersection of Domestic Violence and Guns: The Public Interest 
Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 823 (2000) (internal citation omitted). 
 44.  Ramsey, supra note 10, at 1307. 
 45.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2018). 
 46.  Id. § 922 (g)(8). For this prohibition to be effective, the order must include actual notice and a 
hearing for the person subject to it. 
 47.  Gun Law Navigator—Domestic Violence, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY, https://everytown 
research.org/navigator/states.html?dataset=domestic_violence&states=undefined (last visited July 21, 
2019) (providing visual representation of state restrictions and their relationship to existing federal 
law). 
 48.  Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 531–32 (2003) (footnotes 
omitted) (finding that, between, 1996 and 2001, § 922(g)(8) cases increased from three to sixty-eight, 
while § 922(g)(9) cases grew from one to 125). 
 49.  May, supra note 2, at 2–3 (“Judges are inappropriately denying orders of protection and 
throwing out misdemeanor domestic violence pleas, thereby allowing batterers to continue owning, 
possessing, transferring, and using firearms despite the federal statutes that specifically prohibit them 
from doing so.”). 
 50.  Kerry Shaw, Federal Prosecutors Are Cracking Down on Domestic Abusers Who Keep Guns,  TRACE 
(Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/03/domestic-violence-federal-prosecutions-gun-law/. 
See also Aaron Jolly, Patchwork of Protection: American Regulation of Domestic Gun Violence, 53 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 674, 706–07 (2017) (noting increasing legal enforcement at state level). 
 51.  See generally SUK, supra note 39. 
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contributor to intimate femicide for abusers whose jobs require them to carry a 
gun; and leave victims without weapons for self-defense.”52 
For present purposes, what is notable about these laws is that they reach into 
the home. DV misdemeanants are prohibited from possessing weapons even where 
their interest in self-defense is, as Heller put it, “most acute.” But for women, the 
home has never been a site of autonomy in the same way as it has for men.53 What 
is true of domestic violence generally is true of other crimes as well—most sexual 
assaults (55 percent) occur in the victim’s home, for example, as opposed to just 25 
percent in public places, including enclosed public places like parking lots.54 And 
that, in turn, complicates the notion of the home as a private place in which 
individual interests are at their apex and governmental interests at their lowest 
ebb. As Elizabeth Schneider puts it, “[c]oncepts of privacy permit, encourage, and 
reinforce violence against women.”55 Feminist scholars have long argued that 
domestic violence renders the “private” space of the home effectively “public.”56 
The implications of that transformation are explored in more depth in Jeannie 
Suk’s At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence Revolution is Transforming 
Privacy.57 Suk notes that “[t]he image of the home as the exemplary place of 
coercion and abuse is gaining cultural ascendance. . . .  The rising legal vision of 
the home is that of actual or potential violence. Home is where the crime is.”58 She 
argues that “[l]egal practices make public and private more legally similar spaces 
than they have been in the past, even as the discourse of home abounds.”59 In fact, 
in the particular context of domestic violence protection orders, “it is as if . . . the 
home has become an extension of the courthouse.”60 
This effort to extend legal protections into the home, especially with regard 
to domestic violence and guns, is in some tension with the home-bound or home-
centric approach to the Second Amendment discussed above. It is one thing to 
overcome criminal law’s traditional aversion to regulation within the home.61 It is 
 
 52.  Ramsey, supra note 10, at 1260 (footnotes omitted). Ramsey goes on to emphasize that “a 
simplistic, politically-motivated call for women to arms themselves is not the answer either,” id., and 
that “the myth of guns as an equalizer is supported by neither history nor recent social-scientific 
evidence.” Id. at 1261. 
 53.  Cf. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILLMAN, THE YELLOW WALLPAPER (1899). 
 54.  Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem (last 
visited July 21, 2019). 
 55.  ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 87 (2000). 
 56.  Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence 
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (“Much of feminist academic 
discourse concerning domestic violence has centered on the argument that ‘private’ violence must be 
reconceptualized as ‘public’ in order to compel state intervention.”). 
 57.  SUK, supra note 39. 
 58.  Id.  at 5–6. 
 59.  Id. at 6. 
 60.  Id. at 41. Suk highlights in particular the ways in which protection orders impose a kind of de 
facto divorce. Id. at 43. 
 61.  See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Criminal Law Sanctuaries, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 321, 338–48 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted); Martha Minow, Between Intimates and Between Nations: Can Law Stop the Violence?, 
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 851, 852 (2000) (footnotes omitted). 
Prof. Blocher - FINAL PAGE PROOF 0305 (Do Not Delete) 3/6/2020  9:11 AM 
 THE HOME-CENTRIC SECOND AMENDMENT 53 
quite another to overcome a constitutional limitation—especially one that even 
advocates of gun regulation seem largely to accept. 
III.   CHALLENGES FOR SECOND AMENDMENT THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
Post-Heller Second Amendment theory and doctrine are starting to take 
shape, but foundational questions remain unanswered and in some cases 
unaddressed. What is the basic normative theory of the Second Amendment? How 
should it be interpreted? The intersection of DV and the home-centric vision of the 
Second Amendment can illuminate and complicate those questions. 
Perhaps the two most prominent justificatory theories for the right to keep 
and bear arms are that it promotes personal safety (the self-defense theory) and 
that it prevents tyranny (the anti-tyranny theory). The implications and internal 
workings of each theory are still in their early stages of development.62 But, with a 
few notable exceptions,63 efforts to flesh them out have not paid due attention to 
the important gendered differences in gun violence. 
In general, discussions of the self-defense theory tend to invoke the image of 
“criminals” either in public places or as invaders into the home. And that image 
does a poor job of capturing the primary threats that women face: intimate partner 
violence, especially in the home. Jennifer Carlson notes that “although gun carriers 
may actively promote guns for women, they assume a particular understanding 
of crime that reproduces masculine privilege by emphasizing fast, warlike 
violence perpetrated by strangers—the kinds of crime men, as opposed to women, 
are more likely to face.”64 
Of course, advocates of gun carrying are not blind to the relationship between 
firearms and domestic violence. For some, the solution is for women to arm 
themselves against their abusers.65 NRA leader Wayne LaPierre has insisted both 
that “[t]he only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun”66 
and that “the one thing a violent rapist deserves to face is a good woman with a 
gun.”67 
But that is a much more complicated proposition when the violent rapist is 
one’s own intimate partner, family member, or friend, as is the case for most sexual 
assaults. Often, DV is not a single incident so much as a pattern of abuse, one that 
might not lend itself to a single obvious moment of self-defense. Moreover, some 
studies have shown that gun ownership is ineffective for women facing intimate 
partner violence,68 and that, in fact, women who own guns actually face higher 
 
 62.  For a brief overview of the theories, see BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 24, ch. 6. 
 63.  See supra note 16 and sources cited therein. 
 64.  Jennifer Carlson, The Equalizer? Crime, Vulnerability, and Gender in Pro-Gun Discourse, 9 
FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 59, 61 (2014). 
 65.  See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Alice Marie Beard, Response, Murder, Self-Defense, and the Right to 
Arms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1685, 1691–93 (2013) 
 66.  Peter Overby, NRA: “Only Thing That Stops a Bad Guy with a Gun Is a Good Guy with a Gun,” 
NPR (Dec. 21, 2012, 3:00 PM),  http://www.npr.org/2012/12/21/167824766/nra-only-thing-that-stops-a-
bad-guy-with-a-gun-is-a-good-guy-with-a-gun. 
 67.  Daniel Blackman, Wayne LaPierre, Gun Salesman, HARV. POL. REV. (Mar. 21, 2013), http://harv 
ardpolitics.com/united-states/wayne-lapierre-gun-salesman/. 
 68.  Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
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rates of homicide than those who do not.69 Even if a women does manage to use a 
gun in self-defense against an abuser, the law might not be on her side.70 Contrast, 
for example, the cases of George Zimmerman and Marissa Alexander, who fired a 
shot into the ceiling when her estranged abusive husband threatened her in their 
home. Unlike Zimmerman, she was tried, convicted, and sentenced to twenty 
years.71 
Holding aside the empirical question of whether gun possession makes 
abused women safer, the guns-in-the-home frame highlights the underlying 
theoretical difficulty: Gun ownership, even in the home, is not merely “private.” This 
is a foundational point not only about gun regulation, as feminist scholarship 
about “privacy” and “the home” has illuminated in many areas of law. To take 
just one obvious example, if one is too quick to code sexual activity behind closed 
doors as fundamentally private and constitutionally shielded from state 
intervention, the impact might be to shield marital rape. 
The same is true of the “fearful symmetry” of gun ownership—it is an act 
with consequences for others, even when it comes to something as seemingly 
private as safety within the home. As Justice Stevens put it in his McDonald dissent, 
“[y]our interest in keeping and bearing a certain firearm may diminish my interest 
in being and feeling safe from armed violence.”72 Nowhere is that more true than 
in the context of domestic violence. The very same features that make a gun in the 
home a powerful weapon of self-defense for an abused woman can make it a 
powerful weapon of oppression for her abuser.73 As one abuse survivor put it, “In 
my case I got rid of the gun that I had because basically I was just arming him . . .”74 
To be clear, there is broad agreement that the law can, consistent with the 
Second Amendment, deny guns to abusers. Courts have generally reached that 
conclusion either by carving DV perpetrators out of Second Amendment coverage 
entirely or by finding that government efforts to disarm them survive the requisite 
constitutional scrutiny.75 
But two major doctrinal arguments advanced by gun rights supporters in 
recent years could change that. One is that arms-bearing is currently being treated 
as a “second class” right, and that courts must apply higher scrutiny to Second 
Amendment claims.76 Sometimes this complaint is directed against the courts 
specifically, but sometimes it is a broader claim about social and political bias 
against the right to keep and bear arms. Men in particular are sometimes portrayed 
 
Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1092 (2003). 
 69.  Garen J. Wintemute et al., Mortality Among Recent Purchasers of Handguns, 341 NEW ENGLAND 
J. MED. 1583, 1587 (1999). 
 70.  See generally Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights 
Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008). 
 71.  FRANKS, supra note 16, at 98–99. 
 72.  McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73.  Cf. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 710–12 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
features which make handguns attractive tools of self-defense also make them attractive for criminals). 
 74.  Kellie R. Lynch & TK Logan, “You Better Say Your Prayers and Get Ready”: Guns Within the 
Context of Partner Abuse, 33 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 686, 694 (2018). 
 75.  See infra notes 90–92 and sources cited therein. 
 76.  Ruben & Blocher, supra note 31, at 1447–51.  
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as the victims of this persecution. In one of his speeches to the NRA, Charlton 
Heston claimed that men were on the losing end of the “cultural war.”77 (He also 
identified “feminists” as among the “enemies” of the Constitution.)78 
The general claim about widespread persecution of gun rights is hard to 
credit, given the broad support for gun rights and relative skepticism of 
confiscatory gun control.79 (If anything, the political process failure runs in the 
other direction, as overwhelmingly popular proposals like the expansion of 
background checks cannot even make it out of the Senate.80) But the gendered 
nature of the claim makes it especially relevant and worth noting in the present 
context. If courts were to accept the second class rights claim, and apply more 
stringent scrutiny on the basis that the right to keep and bear arms is under attack, 
DV restrictions could end up being among the laws whose constitutionality would 
be called into question—more so than, say, laws regarding felons.81 
The other doctrinal innovation that some gun rights proponents have 
supported is what is sometimes called the test of “text, history, and tradition”—an 
approach that would evaluate the constitutionality of gun regulations on that 
basis, rather than considerations of government interest and tailoring.82 This 
would, its proponents recognize, mean reasoning from analogy when the history 
and tradition do not clearly speak to a question.83 
In the context of domestic violence prohibitions, the historical record is 
problematic to say the least.  As Carolyn Ramsey notes, “[h]istorical support for 
the exclusion of domestic violence offenders from Second Amendment protection 
 
 77.  Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 191, 233 (2008) (quoting Heston’s speech). 
 78.  FRANKS, supra note 16, at 66. 
 79.  See Michael C. Dorf, Identity Politics and the Second Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 549, 568–
69 (2004) (“[T]he movement for gun rights does not pit an oppressed group against an oppressive 
majority . . . . [S]upporters of gun rights are not, by any reasonable measure, oppressed.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller As Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 260 (2008) 
(“[O]pponents of [gun] control have considerable political power and do not seem to be at a systematic 
disadvantage in the democratic process.”); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Aug. 27, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/article/62124/defense-looseness (“A majority of Americans 
support gun rights.”). 
 80.  Aaron Blake, Manchin-Toomey Gun Amendment Fails, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2013, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2013/04/17/manchin-toomey-gun-amendm 
ent-fails/. 
 81.  Cf. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (“While the categorical regulation of 
gun possession by domestic violence misdemeanants thus appears consistent with Heller’s reference to 
certain presumptively lawful regulatory measures, we agree with the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion in 
[United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)] that some sort of showing must be 
made to support the adoption of a new categorical limit on the Second Amendment right.”). 
 82.  See Tyler v. Hillsdale County Sheriff’s Department, 837 F.3d 678, 702–07 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(Batchelder, J., concurring in most of the judgment); Houston v. City of New Orleans, 675 F.3d 441, 448 
(5th Cir. 2012) (Elrod, J., dissenting), opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g by 682 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 
2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1274 n.6, 1280–81 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
 83.  Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1275. For an argument against wholesale adoption of this test, see Nelson 
Lund, The Proper Role of History and Tradition in Second Amendment Jurisprudence, FLA. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y (forthcoming 2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3454594. 
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appears rather thin.”84 Indeed, for much of US history, domestic violence itself was 
beyond the reach of the law.85 The “right of chastisement”—of husbands to inflict 
corporal punishment on their wives—was recognized in US common law until the 
mid-1800s.86 And, as Reva Siegel notes, “for a century after courts repudiated the 
right of chastisement, the American legal system continued to treat wife beating 
differently from other cases of assault and battery.”87 
At the same time, the legal rights of women to defend themselves against domestic 
violence have also been heavily circumscribed. When the Second Amendment was 
ratified, a woman who killed her husband could face charges not only of murder 
but of petty treason.88 And at least until the 1990s, many courts applied a 
cohabitant exception to the castle doctrine; some have argued that this was done 
specifically to limit the legal rights of women who kill their husbands.89 
To be clear, the argument here is not against the constitutionality of DV 
prohibitors or the right of battered women to defend themselves with arms. In 
practice, courts are likely to consider the question at a somewhat broader level of 
generality, and conclude that DV misdemeanants are relevantly similar to felons, 
and can be denied weapons for the same reasons.90 The point is that the test of text, 
history, and tradition makes that conclusion—which is plainly correct under any 
plausible reading of the Amendment—an exercise in strained analogies. 
CONCLUSION 
My goal in this brief Article has been to suggest that gendered violence—and 
specifically domestic violence by armed abusers—complicates the home-bound or 
home-centric Second Amendment. Exploring those complications is not meant to 
cast any doubt on the constitutionality of current laws restricting gun possession 
by domestic abusers. Courts have been near-unanimous in upholding laws 
banning possession of firearms by those convicted of domestic violence 
 
 84.  Ramsey, supra note 10, at 1301. 
 85.  SUK, supra note 39, at 13. 
 86.  FRANKS, supra note 16, at 77; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2121–41 (1996). 
 87.  Siegel, supra note 86, at 2118. SUK, supra note 39, at 13 (“Although wife beating was formally 
illegal in all U.S. states by 1920, it was not until the 1970s that efforts by the women’s movement to 
recast DV as a public concern began to succeed.”). 
 88.  As Blackstone explained: 
[I]f the baron kills his feme it is the same as if he had killed a stranger, or any other person; 
but if the feme kills her baron, it is regarded by the laws as a much more atrocious crime; as 
she not only breaks through the restraints of humanity and conjugal affection, but throws off 
all subjection to the authority of her husband. And therefore the law denominates her crime 
a species of treason, and condemns her to the same punishment as if she had killed the king. 
And for every species of treason . . . the sentence of women was to be drawn and burnt alive. 
         1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *445 n.103. 
 89.  CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 
82 (1989). 
 90.  See, e.g., United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011) (analogizing § 922(g)(8) to 
“longstanding” gun regulations approved in Heller, and finding it consistent with “a common-law 
tradition that permits restrictions directed at citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible”). 
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misdemeanors91 or subject to domestic violence restraining orders.92 If one looks 
hard enough, there are some arguable outliers,93 but the law is basically settled—
for now. 
And yet one could be forgiven for a sense of unease. After all, the 
constitutionality of nearly all gun regulation was well-settled until Heller was 
decided. There are ominous rumblings, including from within the Court itself. 
In Voisine v. United States,94 the Supreme Court was confronted with the 
question of whether the federal DV prohibitor applies to a person convicted under 
a misdemeanor assault statute that encompassed “reckless” conduct.95 The case 
was widely reported not because of that legal question, but because it marked the 
first time in a decade that Justice Thomas asked a question in oral argument.96 As 
the attorney for the government was concluding her argument, the Justice spoke 
up. “One question,” he said. “[T]his is a misdemeanor violation. It suspends a 
constitutional right. Can you give me another area where a misdemeanor violation 
suspends a constitutional right?”97 He followed up with several questions 
regarding the Second Amendment,98 which had not been briefed or argued. 
Those questions proved to be accurate evidence of his views. In a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Thomas argued that the majority’s construction of the statute 
rendered it unconstitutional. No other Justice joined that part of his opinion, and 
the Court has repeatedly upheld the domestic violence prohibitor without 
expressing any concerns regarding its constitutionality.99 
But Justice Thomas’s opinion is still worth noting, as a potential harbinger of 
things to come. In Printz v. United States100—in which the majority opinion held 
 
 91.  See, e.g., Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 2018) (upholding federal ban on 
possession by those who have committed misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence); United States v. 
Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 
(11th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (same). 
 92.  See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 230 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Mahin, 
668 F.3d 119, 123–24 (4th Cir. 2012); Bena, 664 F.3d at 1184; United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 794, 260 
(10th Cir. 2010). The only pre-Heller federal case to clearly adopt the individual rights reading reached 
the same result. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 93.  Cee v. Stone, 3rd Dist. Union No. 14-17-06, 2017-Ohio-8687 (Nov. 27, 2017) (affirming a 
constitutional challenge to a domestic violence restraining order that prohibited the respondent from 
possessing firearms). 
 94.  Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016). 
 95.  Id. at 2282. 
 96.  Laura Wagner, Clarence Thomas Asks 1st Question from Supreme Court Bench in 10 Years, NPR 
(Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/02/29/468576931/clarence-thomas-
asks-1st-question-from-supreme-court-bench-in-10-years. 
 97.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–36, Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (No. 14-10154). 
 98.  Id. at 35–42 (“[Y]ou’re saying that recklessness is sufficient to trigger a . . . misdemeanor 
violation of domestic conduct that results in a lifetime ban on possession of a gun, which, at least as of 
now, is still a constitutional right . . . . Can you think of another constitutional right that can be 
suspended based upon a misdemeanor violation of a State law?”). 
 99.  See, e.g., Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2276; United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 162–63 (2014) 
(holding that the predicate offense that triggers application of § 922(g)(9), “misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence,” requires only “offensive touching” and not “force”). 
 100. Printz v. United States,  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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that the anti-commandeering doctrine permits local law enforcement officers to 
refuse to perform the background checks required by the Brady Act—he wrote a 
separate concurring opinion, again joined by no other Justice. Although Printz, like 
Voisine, technically involved no Second Amendment question, he pointed to the 
“impressive array of historical evidence” and the “growing body of scholarly 
commentary [that] indicates that the ‘right to keep and bear arms’ is, as the 
Amendment’s text suggests, a personal right.”101 Thomas concluded his opinion 
by speculating that the future may present an opportunity for the Court “to 
determine whether Justice Story was correct when he wrote that the right to bear 
arms ‘has justly been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.’”102 
Eleven years later, the Court held as much in Heller.103 An uncritical adoption 
of the home-centric view of the Amendment could raise similar challenges for DV 
laws in the future. 
* * * 
 
 
 101.  Id. at 938 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 102.  Id. at 939. 
 103.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. at 606 (noting, in the course of recognizing an 
individual right to keep and bear arms, St. George Tucker’s suggestion that the Second Amendment 
was “true palladium of liberty”). 
